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rights at issue in both Lockhart and Nix, the right to present mitigating
evidence at trial is recognized by the law.42 Williams was entitled to
present such evidence. Thus, Lockhart i8 readily distinguishable from
the situation in Williams and the supreme court's reliance on it was badly
misplaced.
In short, the Supreme Court of Virginia has attempted to take
what was intended by the U.S. Supreme Court to be an infrequently used
addition to the Strickland test and made it generally applicable to all
ineffective assistance claims in Virginia. In so doing the court has made
it even more difficult for a prisoner to carry the burden on an ineffective
assistance claim and receive relief even where "there [was] a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different."43
42 Va. Code § 19.2-264.4(b) (1983).
43 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
This case, if nothing else, illustrates the importance of present-
ing all the mitigating evidence that is available during the sentencing
hearing. The circuit court in Williams put it very succinctly: "at a capital
murder sentencing, any evidence which might be favorable or mitigating
can mean the difference between 'life or death."' 44 Following the
decision in Williams, it is more important than ever that counsel presents
an effective case during both the guilt and sentencing phases including
all available mitigating evidence.
Summary and Analysis by:
Brian S. Clarke
44 Williams v. Warden, 487 S.E.2d 194, 197 (1997).
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I. Introduction
Under Virginia Code Section 17-110.1(C) (2) the Supreme Court of
Virginia is required to determine whether a sentence of death in a given
case is disproportionate to sentences imposed in similar cases. Despite
this statutory requirement, the Supreme Court of Virginiais not conduct-
ing adequate proportionality review. Consequently, the defendant is
denied a state created right in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause. Additionally, the lax treatment of proportionality
review in Virginia violates the constitutional requirement of meaningful
appellate review.
The pathetic state of proportionality review in Virginia may be
analyzed at three levels. First, under existing Supreme Court precedent,
an argument exists that although proportionality review is not constitu-
tionally required, meaningful appellate review is required. Therefore,
the inadequate proportionality review conducted by the Supreme Court
of Virginia, in combination with its weak application of other statutory
provisions in Virginia Code Section 17-110.1, renders appellate review
meaningless and, therefore, unconstitutional.
The second part of this article analyzes proportionality review
under Virginia case law. Here, the emphasis is on the skewed standard
that results from the limited universe of cases the court is willing to
consider. Case law also suggests that the court'is not following the
procedures set forth in Virginia Code Section 17-110.1. Theresultofthis
is a denial of a state created right to proportionality review.
Finally, in the last section, the article compares Virginia's propor-
tionality review process with other states that engage in more thorough
review procedures.
II Proportionality Review Before Pulley v. Harris
The language of Furman v. Georgia' suggests that some form of
meaningful appellate review is necessary to guard against the arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty. When the Supreme Court reinstated the
death penalty in 1976, it did so, in part, because meaningful appellate
1408 U.S. 238 (1972).
review was included in the death penalty statutes before the Court. Thus,
the standard evolved from Furman that to pass constitutional muster,
meaningful appellate review must be part of a state's death penalty
statute. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has held that
proportionality review is not a constitutionally necessary element of
meaningful appellate review.
2
A. Meaningful Appellate Review
In Furman, the United States Supreme Court declared existing
death penalty statutes unconstitutional. It held that the death penalty
could not be imposed under sentencing schemes that created a substantial
risk that death would be inflicted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
The concern for proportional sentencing was expressed by Justice
Douglas inhis concurrencetoFurman. He stated that '[t]he high service
rendered by the "cruel and unusual" punishment clause of the Eighth
Amendment is to require legislatures to write penal laws that are
evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see
to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily
to unpopular groups."'
3
Four years later, the Supreme Court found that the death penalty
schemes in Georgia, Florida, and Texas satisfied Furman. Part of the
Court's justification for approving the sentencing schemes in these three
states was the inclusion of meaningful appellate review in their death
penalty statutes.
In Gregg v. Georgia,4 the United States Supreme Court held that
Georgia's death penalty scheme was constitutional, in part, because it
required that the Georgia Supreme Court review each sentence of death
and determine whether the sentence of death was proportional to those
sentences imposed in similar cases.5 The Court wrote:
2 pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
3 Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
4428 U.S. 153 (1976).
5 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198.
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[T]o guard further against a situation comparable to that
presented in Furman, the Supreme Court of Georgia compares
each death sentence with the sentence imposed on similarly
situated defendants to ensure that the sentence of death in a
particular case is not disproportionate. On their face, these
procedures seem to satisfy the concerns of Furman. No longer
should there be "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the
few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not."'
6
The language in Gregg indicates that proportionality review is a
safeguard against the freakish and arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty, a concern the Furman Court relied on in declaring existing death
penalty schemes unconstitutional. Although the Court in Gregg did not
expressly state that proportionality review was constitutionally required,
it seemed to regard such review as an element of effective appellate
review.
7
The decision in Gregg was issued the same day as the decisions in
Proffitt v. Florida8 and Jurek v. Texas.9 In Proffitt, the Court ruled that
the Florida death penalty statute was constitutionally sound partly
because it provided for automatic review of all death sentences by the
Florida Supreme Court. Unlike the Georgia statute, the Florida statute
did not require any specific form of review. Nonetheless, the two statutes
were similar in that both considered the function of meaningful appellate
review to be to "'[guarantee] that the [aggravating and mitigating]
reasons present in one case will reach a similar result to that reached
under similar circumstances in another case .... If a defendant is
sentenced to die, this Court can review that case in light of the other
decisions and determine whether or not the punishment is too great." 10
Although the statute in Proffitt did not use the magic words
"proportionality review," that is the end to which the statute is clearly
directed. This interpretation is further supported by the Court's reference
to Proffitt in Gardner v. Florida.11 There, the Court referred to Proffitt
when stating:
Since the State must administer its capital-sentencing proce-
dures with an even hand.., it is important that the record on
appeal disclose to the reviewing court the considerations
which motivated the death sentence in every case in which it
is imposed. Without full disclosure of the basis for the death
sentence, the Florida capital sentencing procedure would be
subject to the defects which resulted in the holding of uncon-
stitutionality in Furman v. Georgia.
12
6 Id. at 198 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J.,
concurring))(emphasis added).
7 See also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890 (1983), where the
Court stated: "Our decision in this case depends in part on the existence
ofanimportant procedural safeguard, the mandatory appellate review of
each death sentence by the Georgia Supreme Court to avoid arbitrariness
and assure proportionality .... Aswenotedin Gregg... we have also been
assured that a death sentence will be vacated if it is excessive or
substantially disproportionate to the penalties that have been imposed
under similar circumstances."
8428 U.S. 242 (1976).
9428 U.S. 262 (1976). Although Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976), was also decided on the same day as Gregg, Proffitt and
Jurek, its holding (that a mandatory death penalty scheme was unconsti-
tutional) is not relevant to this article.
10 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 251 (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1,10
(Fla. 1973))(emphasis added).
11430 U.S. 349 (1977).
12 Gardner, 430 U.S. at 361.
This language smacks of proportionality review. Essentially, the Court
is requiring full disclosure by the trial court to the reviewing court of the
considerations used in determining sentencing so that the state's capital
sentencing procedures would be administered with "an even hand."
In Jurek, the Court found that the Texas death penalty statute was
constitutionally sound. It stated that:
By providing prompt judicial review of the jury's decision in
a court with statewide jurisdiction, Texas has provided a
means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and consistent
imposition of death sentences under law. Because this system
serves to assure that sentences of death will not be "wantonly"
or "freakishly" imposed, it does not violate the Constitution. 
13
Although the Texas statute did not expressly provide for proportionality
review, the quoted language calling for evenhandedness and consistency
in sentencing evidence a concern for proportionality.
Gardner, Proffitt, and Jurek signaled a new beginning for death
penalty law. These three cases provided a framework for states to
structure their death penalty statutes in conformity with the requirements
of Furman. One of these requirements was meaningful appellate review.
Arguably, the Court defined mandatory appellate review as containing
some element of proportionality. This is clear in both Gardner and
Proffitt, and although the Texas statute in Jurek did not expressly call for
a proportionality review, it did contain an evenhandedness requirement
that is synonymous with proportional sentencing.
B. Proportionality Review after Pulley v. Harris
While the Court seemingly indorsed proportionality review in
Gregg and Proffitt, its holding in Pulley v. Harris foreclosed any
argument thatproportionality review is constitutionally required. Harris
argued that the California death penalty statute was unconstitutional
under Gregg because it did not provide for proportionality review. The
Court, in analyzing Gregg, Proffitt, andJurek, concluded thatits decision
in Jurek, finding the Texas statute constitutionally sound without an
express requirement of proportionality review, made it clear that propor-
tionality review was not a constitutional requirement. 14 The Court
reasoned that the Jurek holding, which found that the Texas' appellate
review provided "a means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and
consistent imposition of death sentences," was revealing, inpart,because
"in light of the other safeguards in the Texas statute, proportionality
review would have been constitutionally superfluous."
'15
Whatever the Harris Court meant by this statement, it certainly did
not adequately address the evenhandedness language of Jurek. More-
over, it suggested that proportionality review, which was seemingly a
clearrequirementinProffitt and Gardner, was notnecessary. As aresult,
the decision in Pulley established that proportionality review was not
constitutionally necessary.
Nevertheless, the Court in Harris qualified its holding by stating
that a "a capital sentencing system so lacking in other checks on
arbitrariness" may not "pass constitutional muster without compara-
tive proportionality review." 16 This language supports the argument
that absent some type of meaningful appellate review, proportionality
review may be constitutionally required.
13Jurek, 428 U.S. at276 (quotingFurman, 408 U.S. at3 10)(empha-
sis added).
14 Harris, 465 U.S. at 44-45.
15 Id. at 49.
16 Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
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Meaningful appellate review was also deemed a constitutional
necessity in Parker v. Dugger.17 There, the Court held that it was
constitutional error for the state supreme court to not consider nonstatu-
tory mitigating evidence in its review of the death sentence. In so doing,
the Court stated that meaningful appellate review plays a crucial role in
preventing the arbitrary and irrational imposition of the death penalty. 18
The Court stated that "[i]t cannot be gainsaid that meaningful appellate
review requires that the appellate court consider the defendant's actual
record" including the character of the defendant and the circumstances
of the crime. 19
Harris and Parker suggest that the absence of meaningful appellate
review may lift proportionality review from the level of a mere proce-
dural safeguard to that of a constitutional requirement. Therefore,
because the Supreme Courtof Virginia is failing to fulfill its statutory and
constitutional requirement of meaningful appellate review, proportion-
ality review becomes a necessity.
Virginia Code Section 17.110.120 establishes the process of appel-
late review of death penalty cases. Subsection (C)(1) requires the
Supreme Court of Virginia to consider whether the death sentence was
imposed "under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary
factor." Subsection (C)(2) sets out the standard of proportionality
review. A review of case law reveals that the Supreme Court of Virginia
is not fulfilling the requirement of reviewing for "passion, prejudice or
any other arbitrary factor."
In Mu'Min v. Pruett,21 the defendant argued that Virginia Code
Section 17-110.1(C) required the Supreme Court of Virginia to "deter-
mine[ ] that his conviction and sentence were free of fundamental
constitutional error because such errors would constitute arbitrary fac-
tors requiring the invalidation of his death sentence."'22 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed, stating that
Virginia Code Section 17-110.1(C) did not require the Supreme Court of
Virginia to review the trial record for constitutional error. Instead, the
court of appealsreasoned that subsection (C) required the Supreme Court
of Virginia to determine only "whether the imposition of the death
penalty was influencedby improperconsiderations; theprovision simply
does not require the court to examine the record for constitutional errors
not specified on appeal."
'23
According to the court of appeals analysis of subsection (C), the
statute has no teeth. The court's review of "improper considerations" is
virtually meaningless because it is not looking for constitutional error.
17498 U.S. 308 (1991).
18 Parker, 498 U.S. at 321.
19 1d. See alsoBuchanan v.Angelone, 103 F.3d344 (4th Cir. 1996),
where the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reiterated
the necessity of appellate review in its analysis of Virginia Code Section
17-110.1(C). There, the court of appeals stated that "[m]eaningful
appellate review is an important safeguard against improper imposition
of the death penalty." Id., at 350 (citing Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308,
321 (1991)).
20 Specifically, Virginia Code Section 17-110.1 (1996) states:
C. In addition to consideration of any errors in the trial
enumerated by appeal, the court shall consider and deter-
mine:
1. Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary
factor, and
2. Whether the sentence of death is excessive or dispro-
portionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, con-
sidering both the crime and the defendant.
211997 WL 468283 (4th Cir. 1997). See case summary of Mu'Min,
Cap. Def. J., this issue.
22 Mu'Min, 1997 WL at 4.
23 Id.
Therefore, Virginia appellate review of death sentences has little effect
in safeguarding against the freakish and arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty, a major concern of Furman and a requirement which Gardner,
Proffitt and Jurek were designed to prevent. In light of the weak
application of (C)(1) of the Virginia Code, the absence of true propor-
tionality review would render Virginia appellate review meaningless.
Arguably, under the qualified holding of Harris, proportionality review
would become constitutionally required in this situation.
m. Proportionality Review in Virginia
Even though the United States Supreme Court has held that propor-
tionality review is not constitutionally required, it is mandatory under
Virginialaw.24 Thus, the Supreme Court of Virginiamust"consider and
determine... [w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or dispropor-
tionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the
crime and the defendant." 25 In doing this, the court considers a limited
universe of cases consisting of "all capital felony cases tried within such
period of time as the court may determine." 26 Case law has interpreted
this to mean that the court must consider all capital murder cases "in
which the death penalty was based on both predicates, including cases
where life imprisonment was imposed."' 27
In practice, however, the court is not conducting proportionality
review as envisioned by the statute and case law. First, it fails to give
weight to life imprisonment cases. Instead, the court gives a cursory
review of life imprisonment cases while according a greater degree of
analysis to cases where death was imposed. In selecting the cases in this
manner, the court is able to find a sentence of deathproportional in every
situation. Second, by not considering both the crime and the defendant
in its analysis, the Supreme Court of Virginia violates Virginia Code
Section 17-110.1(C) which expressly requires that the crime and defen-
dant be considered in proportionality review. Finally, the court's refusal
to consider lesser sentences received by a codefendant in its proportion-
ality analysis violates the requirement of determining whether a sentence
was excessive compared to those generally imposed for a given set of
facts.
A. Life Imprisonment Ignored
The Supreme Court of Virginia has stated numerous times that in
conducting proportionality review it considers all capital murder cases.
In analyzing the court's procedures, it is apparent that considering "all
capital murder cases" translates into a mere skimming of those cases
where the defendant was sentenced to life, while giving "particular
24 See Va. Code §§ 17-110.1(C)(1) and (2) (1996).
25 Va. Code § 17-1 10.1(C)(1) (1996). Because the statute requires
the court to consider "both the crime and the defendant," it is the
responsibility of defense counsel to provide information on this matter in
the form of an appellate index in addition to what was offered at trial.
26 Va. Code §§ 17-110.1(E) (1996). Specifically, subsection (E)
states that"[t]he Supreme Court may accumulate the records of all capital
felony cases tried within such period of time as the court may determine.
The court shall consider such records as are available as a guide in
determining whether the sentence imposed in the case under review is
excessive. Such records as are accumulated shall be made available to
the circuit courts." Apparently, the Supreme Court of Virginia consults
a computerized database in conducting proportionality review. In
response to a request by the author to gain access to this database, the
Director of Management Information Systems stated that this database
is "a work in progress" and not yet available for use or distribution at this
time.
27 Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 462, 423 S.E.2d 360,
371 (1992)(quoting Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 261, 421
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attention" to cases resulting in a sentence of death.
28
This practice is clear in Turner v. Williams.29 There, the defendant
argued that Virginia Code Section 17-110.1(C) was unconstitutional
because it failed to compare his death sentence to cases where life
imprisonment was imposed. The court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment by stating that the Supreme Court of Virginia interprets Virginia
Code Section 17-110.1(C) to "require only a comparison with death
sentence cases, rather than also requiring comparison with life imprison-
ment cases.
' 30
In support of its conclusion, the court cited Stamper v. Common-
wealth.3 1 In Stamper, the court stated that, for proportionality review
purposes, "[t]he test is not whether ajury may have declined to recom-
mend the death penalty in a particular case but whether generally juries
S.E.2d 821, 845 (1992). See also Fry v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 413,
419,463 S.E.2d 433,436 (1995), where the Supreme Court of Virginia
defined the geographic scope of proportionality review, stating that "we
do not confine our review to a single city or county; instead, we compare
the case before us to all capital murder cases this Court has reviewed,
giving particular attention to cases similar in crime and aggravating
factor." Id.
28 Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 501,516,450 S.E.2d 146,
155-56 (1994). See also Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442,469,470
S.E.2d 114, 132 (1996) (stating that the court examines all capital murder
cases, including those where life was imposed, but gives particular
attention to those where the death penalty was imposed); Mickens v.
Commonwealth, 252 Va. 315, 323, 478 S.E.2d 302, 307 (1996)(stating
that all capital murder cases are reviewed for proportionality, but particu-
lar attention is given to those cases where the death sentence was based
upon the same predicates as defendant's); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 249
Va. 95, 105,452 S.E.2d 669, 676 (1995)(stating that while life sentence
cases are reviewed, particular attention is given to those cases where
death is based on the same predicates as in defendant's case); Breard v.
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 89, 445 S.E.2d 670, 682 (1994)(giving
particular attention to eases where death was imposed); Williams v.
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 550, 450 S.E.2d 365, 379 (1994)(stating
that, while it does review cases where life is imposed, it pays particular
attention to those cases in which death was based on both predicates);
Chabrol v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 327, 335, 427 S.E.2d 374, 378-79
(1993)(reviewing all capital felony cases, but giving particular attention
to those cases where the death penalty was based on the relevantpredicate
in defendant's case); Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 271, 389
S.E.2d 871, 886 (1990) (court only considered cases in which the sen-
tence of death was based on aggravating factors similar to defendant's
case); and Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535,553,323 S.E.2d
577, 589 (1984)(stating that although the court considers all capital
murder cases, it takes "particular note" of those cases where the jury
imposed capital punishment).
29 812 F. Supp. 1400 (E.D.Va. 1993).
30 Turner, 812 F.Supp. at 1419, affd. Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d
872 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd on other grounds by O'Dell v. Netherland, 95
F.3d 1214 (4th Cir. 1996).
31220 Va. 260, 257 S.E.2d 808 (1979). The court also cited King
v. Commonwealth 243 Va. 353, 371, 416 S.E.2d 669, 679 (1992)(Su-
preme Court of Virginia reaffirmed that the test for proportionality
review was "not whether a jury may have declined to recommend the
death penalty in a particular case but whether generally juries in [Vir-
ginia] impose the death sentence for conduct similar to that of the
defendant"); and Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 340, 362
S.E.2d 650, 669 (1987)(Supreme Court of Virginia, in conducting
proportionality review, considered all capital felony cases, as required by
subsection (E), but gave particular emphasis to those cases where the
death penalty was based upon the same predicate as Townes' sentence).
in this jurisdiction impose the death sentence for conduct similar to that
of the defendant."
'32
According to Stamper, the court must give weight only to those
cases in which the jury chose to sentence the defendant to death, not to
cases in which the "jury may have declined to recommend the death
penalty."'33 This leads to a form of proportionality review that is skewed
in favor of death. When the universe of cases is limited to death cases,
a defendant stands little chance of convincing the court that the circum-
stances of his orher crime is deserving of life, since there are no life cases
with which to compare. Rather, the defendant is left to the impossible
task of convincing the court that his or her capital crime was not as
egregious as those cases in which death was imposed. 34 Arguably, the
court has developed a convenient standard by which a defendant con-
victed of a capital crime, is, by definition, deserving of a sentence of
death. In other words, death is always proportional.
The courtof appeals condoned this practice inPeterson v. Murray.
35
Petitioner argued that the Supreme Court of Virginia erred by "consid-
ering only cases in which the death penalty had been imposed" and
ignoring those where death was sought but the defendant received
another sentence.36 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit rejected Peterson's argument and found that due process was not
violated by the Supreme Court of Virginia's emphasis on death cases in
its proportionality review. The court concluded by stating that "[in any
event, "'this court may not issue a writ of habeas corpus on the ground
that the [Virginia] Supreme Court has made an error of state law.'
37
The combined effect of Turner, Stamper, and Peterson is that the
Supreme Court of Virginia is free to exclude life imprisonment cases
from its proportionality review with the Fourth Circuit's blessing. As it
stands, the universe of cases under Virginia Code Section 17-110.1 (C) is
limited to those cases in which the defendant was found guilty of capital
murder and sentenced to death at thepenalty phase. As aresult, death will
always be proportional.
38
32 Stamper, 220 Va. at 283-84, 257 S.E.2d 808 at 824. See also
Poyner v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401, 430, 329 S.E.2d 815, 834-35
(1985)(stating that "whether defendant could be sentenced to life
imprisonment is not the question; the question is whether the death
penalty is customarily imposed in crimes of this kind")(emphasis in
original).
33 Id. at 284, 257 S.E.2d at 824.
34 Another example of how the Supreme Court of Virginia disre-
gards life sentences and focuses only on death sentences in proportion-
ality review is found in Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 410
S.E.2d 254(1991). There, the court focused on cases in which the death
penalty was based on a predicate identical to that in defendant's case. The
one life imprisonment case the court cursorily reviewed was simply
tagged as an "exception" to what juries within the relevant jurisdiction
"generally" impose. Id. at 141,410 S.E.2d at 268.
35 904 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1990).
36 Peterson, 904 F.2d at 887.
37 Id (quoting Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304, 317 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984)).
38 The National Center for State Courts summarized this problem,
stating that:
Comparing a case under review solely to other cases in
which a death sentence has been imposed makes the size
of the pool more manageable. However, it fails to address
the question framed by Justice White in Furman - how
can the few cases in which a death sentence is imposed be
"meaningfully distinguished" from the many apparently
similar cases that resulted in a life sentence? Although
the case under review may be similar to another death
case, it may also be similar to thirty life cases. Without
Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1 - Page 37
B. Make the Court Consider Both the Crime and the
Defendant
Not only has the Supreme Court of Virginia failed to review life
imprisonment cases while conducting proportionality review, it has also
not fulfilled its statutory obligation to consider both the crime and the
defendant when reviewing for proportionality. Therefore, it is para-
mount that defense counsel either include in a motion to dismiss the
indictment an exhibit demonstrating the excessiveness of a death sen-
tence in the defendant's case or prepare an appendix to the appellate brief
to the Supreme Court of Virginia to assist in its proportionality review.
Both Chandlerv. Commonwealth39 andRoachv. Commonwealth40
exemplify how counsel can take an active role in proportionality review.
Both cases involve relatively minimal circumstances, and in each the
court found the sentence of death proportional despite defense counsel's
attempts at demonstrating that the circumstances of the crime and the
individual defendant did not warrant death.
In Chandler, the defendant was convicted of capital murder in the
commission of a robbery. The facts showed that Chandler entered a
convenience store planning to steal beer and money. He approached the
cashier and with a gun in his hand, demanded money. The cashier did not
respond. Chandler then closed his eyes and shot the cashier once,
followed by a second shot to the cashier's head, killing him.
4 1
On automatic review to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Chandler's
attorney presented forty-eight cases to assist in the court's proportional-
ity review. In eighteen of these cases the sentence of death was based on
future dangerousness. In the other thirty, the sentence of death was based
on both vileness and future dangerousness. Chandler claimed that the
circumstances surrounding his case and his own personal background
demonstrated that he was much less likely to pose a danger to society in
the future.
42
Despite defense counsel's efforts to assist the court in its propor-
tionality review, the court failed to consider information regarding the
particular defendant. Instead, it considered only the circumstances of the
crime, ignoring mitigating evidence, the comparison between this par-
ticular defendant and other defendants convicted of capital murder, and
the likelihood that the defendant would be a danger to society in the
future. This action by the court violates therequirement in Virginia Code
Section 17-110.1 (C) that the court must consider"both the crime and the
defendant." Arguably, the court's failure to comply with the statutory
requirements is a denial of a state created right in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.43 Nonetheless, defense
examining the life cases, it is impossible to develop the
rational distinctions required. Lawrence S. Lustberg &
Lenora M. Lapidus, The Importance of Saving the Uni-
verse: Keeping Proportionality Review Meaningful, 26
Seton Hall L. Rev. 1423, 1430 (1996)(quoting National
Center for State Courts, User Manual for Prototype
ProportionalityReview Systems, atA- 7 (1984) (citations
omitted).
39 249 Va. 270,455 S.E.2d 219 (1995).
40 251 Va. 324, 468 S.E.2d 98 (1996).
41 Chandler, 249 Va. at 274,455 S.E.2d at 221-22.
42 Id. at 283-84, 455 S.E.2d at 227.
43SeeEvittsv.Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,401 (1985)(stating that the state
must comply with the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause when
it provides for aright of review or appeal); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460
(1983)(mandatory state procedures may give rise to a protected liberty
interest).
counsel's actions in gathering information regarding the circumstances
of the crime and the character of the defendant is commendable.
44
Similar to counsel in Chandler, Roach's defense counsel played an
active role in proportionality review. Roach was convicted of capital
murderin the commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon.
The facts showed that the victim, Roach's neighbor whom he had visited
frequently and helped with household chores, died of a single gunshot
wound to the chest. Her purse and Buick had been taken from her home.
Roach, who was 17-years old at the time of the offense, confessed to the
murder
45
Pursuant to Virginia Code Section 17.1-110.1 (E), Roach's counsel
submitted an appendix to his appellate brief containing a summary of
seventy-two Virginia capital cases, fifty-eight of which resulted in a
sentence of life imprisonment. The appendix contained information
regarding the seventy-two cases, including other crimes proved or
described leading to defendant's conviction, facts supporting vileness or
aggravated battery, age of defendant, age of and relationship to victim,
type of firearm used and the number of shots discharged, other causes of
the victim's death, and defendant's other violent and nonviolent crimes.
This appendix was used in support of the argument that the circumstances
of Roach's case warranted a sentence of life imprisonment and that a
sentence of death was excessive and disproportionate under Virginia
Code Section 17-110.1(C).
Although the court claimed to conduct its proportionality review in
compliance with the standard set out in Jenkins v. Commonwealth,
4 6
which requires the court to consider both the crime and the defendant, it
ignored the majority of appellant's appendix.47 Instead, it chose to
compare appellant's case to three other cases that contained more
44 Along with highlighting the role of defense counsel in propor-
tionality review, Chandler raises three other important points. First,
regarding future dangerousness, the court stated that proportionality
review does not consist of a comparison of "perceived degrees of
potential future dangerousness" between the defendant and others con-
victed of similar crimes. Rather, the court reasoned that "a finding of
future dangerousness delineates the category of cases in which a sentence
of death was imposed that we will use for comparison purposes." 249 Va.
at 284, 455 S.E.2d at 227. Second, the court indicated that it would not
consider mitigation in its review by stating that "mitigating circum-
stances generally have been a factor in instances where similar crimes
have received the lesser penalty." Id. at 284, 455 S.E.2d at 227-28.
Finally, the court found that in instances where the defendant was
sentenced to death, "cruelty and lack of respect for human life" was a
circumstance of the crime. Id. at 284, 455 S.E.2d at 227. Arguably, this
is a circumstance of every murder, making it impossible to distinguish
between those crimes deserving of death and those where life imprison-
ment is appropriate. The narrowing requirement of death cases is
eliminated. For more on Chandler, see case summary of Chandler, Cap.
Def. Dig., Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 2 8 (1995).
45 Roach, 251 Va. at 330-32, 468 S.E.2d at 101-02.
46 244 Va. 445, 423 S.E.2d 360 (1992). The Jenkins standard
requires the court to consider "whether other sentencing bodies in this
jurisdiction generally impose the supreme penalty for comparable or
similar crimes, considering both the crime and defendant." Id. at 461,
423 S.E.2d at 371.
47 Although the Supreme Court of Virginia is not obligated to
consider appellant's independent proportionality review, it is recom-
mended that defense counsel include this type of appendix to appellant's
brief. By doing so, the appendix becomes part of the record for review
by federal courts in their review of the adequacy of appellate review by
the Supreme Court of Virginia. Additionally, in the event that a sentence
of death would be extremely disproportional in a given case, defense
counsel, in his or her motion to quash the capital indictment, should
include the issue and consider filing an exhibit containing cases that
Page 38 - Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1
aggravatingfacts thenthoseinRoach. 48 Infailing to consider appellant's
appendix, the Supreme Court of Virginia ignored the varying degrees of
aggravating evidence. It also ignored mitigating evidence, as all three of
the cases reviewed by the court did not include the extensive evidence in
mitigation as Roach's case did. Nor were any of the three defendants
minors at the time of the offense. As in Chandler, the Roach court failed
to comply with the requirement of Virginia Code Section 17-110.1 that
it consider both the crime and the defendant thereby infringing upon the
Fourteenth Amendment by denying Roach his state created right of
proportionality review.
49
C. The "Lucky" Co-defendant Analysis
Finally, the court's disregard of proportionality review is apparent
in its decisions involving codefendants. According to case law, codefen-
dants who are equally culpable and convicted of capital murder based on
similar evidence may receive different sentences without implicating
proportionality review.50 Because the court must consider all capital
cases in determining what sentences juries generally impose given
particular facts, some consideration should be given to instances in
which one defendant is sentenced to death while the other is sentenced
to life based on the same fact pattern. Certainly, the sentence of life
should be considered in the court's analysis of proportionality review
since the life sentence demonstrates what type of sentencing juries find
appropriate for which crimes.
In Coppola, a case involving codefendants, the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that a codefendant is not necessarily entitled to commuta-
tion of a death sentence simply because an "equally culpable confeder-
ate, on substantially the same evidence, has been sentenced to life
imprisonment." 51 This lucky-codefendant rule seems to contradict the
requirement that the Supreme Court of Virginia consider whether the
sentence of death is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases. It goes without saying that a codefendant is involved in a similar
case as that of the defendant. Although it is certainly not necessary, or
desirable, that a defendant receive the same sentence as his or her
demonstrate the excessiveness of a sentence of death. As grounds for this
claim, defense counsel may assert a violation of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments. By raising the issue in the trial court, counsel can
establish the seriousness of the proportionality claim in the case.
48 Roach, 251 Va. at 351,468 S.E.2d at 113. The court, in picking
and choosing cases for comparison, selected Chichester v. Common-
wealth, 248 Va. 311,448 S.E.2d 638 (1994)(defendant and accomplice
planned and carried out the robbery of a restaurant, where the defendant
shot and killed an employee; defendant had previously committed armed
robbery where he attempted to shoot an employee in the head; counsel
presented little mitigation at the penalty phase); Chandler, 249 Va. 270,
455 S.E.2d 219 (1995)(defendant convicted of capital murder in the
commission of armed robbery and had previously been convicted of
assault and battery, armed robbery, and several other offenses); Joseph
v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 452 S.E.2d 862 (1995)(defendant con-
victed of capital murder in the commission of armed robbery; defendant
shot the sandwich shop employee in the back while the employee lay face
down on the floor; defendant had been convicted of armed robbery and
abduction twice before and of assaulting a police officer; mitigation
presented by defense counsel was not as extensive as that presented in
Roach).
49 For more on Roach, see case summary of Roach, Cap. Def. J.,
Vol. 8, No. 2, p.11 (1996).
50 Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243,257 S.E.2d 797 (1979).
51 Coppola, 220 Va. at 258, 257 S.E.2d at 807.
codefendant, it merely seems logical that a lesser sentence received by a
codefendant should be given considerable weight in proportionality
review.
In Coppola, the defendant and codefendant both participated in the
robbery and murder of the victim. The facts showed that Coppola "struck
the [victim] in the face and repeatedly beat her head against the floor" and
that his codefendant, Militer, also struck the victim.52 The evidence
showed that both defendants participated in the fatal beating of the victim
and that Militer actively participated in the planning and commission of
the robbery. Furthermore, there was testimony that Militer's blows
actually killed the victim and that the morning after the murder, he stated
that he was the one who killed the victim.
53
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Virginia managed to find that
Coppola was more culpable then Militer. The court decided to read its
own meaning into Militer's testimony, stating "[a]lthough Militer may
have believed thathe delivered the final blow to [the victim], most of his
attention was directed to [the victim's] husband, and Coppola dealt
primarily with [the victim]". 54 Although the court went to great lengths
to find Coppola more culpable then his codefendant, it stated that equally
culpable defendants convicted on substantially the same evidence pass
proportionality review even though one is sentenced to death and the
other to life. Essentially, the court labeled this discrepancy as jury
sentencing "discretion," stating that "some degree of discretion inheres
in our criminal justice process."
'55
The courtstated that"[a] jury's decision nottorecommend thedeath
sentence where the evidence would support a sentence of death does not
change the applicable statewide standard." This reasoning does not
comport with the requirements of Virginia Code Sections 17-110.1(C)
and (E) and Jenkins. According to the statute and case law governing
proportionality review, any decision by ajury to sentence a defendant to
life imprisonment on a certain set of facts should be factored into the
court's consideration of what sentences juries in a particular jurisdiction
generally impose for particular conduct. Certainly the court is not
obligated to ensure that both defendants are sentenced to the same
punishment. Nonetheless, it is obligated to consider the lesser sentence
imposed on the codefendant when reviewing similar cases as required by
the statute. But the court did not see it this way. Instead, it chose to view
the jury's decision in sentencing Militer to life imprisonment as an
isolated incident not to be considered in proportionality review.
56 This
"lucky-codefendant" analysis by the court is yet another example of its
total disregard for adequate proportionality review.57
52 1d. at 246, 257 S.E.2d at 800.
53 Id. at 257, 257 S.E.2d at 806-07, n.5.
54 1d. at 257, 257 S.E.2d at 807.
55 Coppola, 220 Va. at 258, 257 S.E.2d 807.
56 For other cases in which the defendant unsuccessfully argued that
his sentence was not proportional to an accomplice, see Murphy v.
Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136,145,431 S.E.2d 48, 53-54 (1993); Thomas
v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1, 26, 419 S.E.2d 606, 620 (1992); King v.
Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353, 371,416 S.E.2d 669, 679 (1992); Evans
v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 766, 780, 284 S.E.2d 816, 823 (1981).
57 See also People v. Bean, 560 N.E.2d 258 (1l. 1990)(in conduct-
ing proportionality review, court must determine whether defendant's
sentence is "unduly severe" compared to codefendant's sentence by
considering the degree of involvement of each in the offense); People v.
Jimerson, 535 N.E.2d 889,908 (Ill. 1989)(stating that court will consider
"whether a sentence of death in a particular case is disproportionately
harsh in comparison with the less severe sanction imposed on a codefen-
dant convicted of the same crime"); Beck v. State, 396 So.2d 645, 664
(Ala. 198 1)(stating that in conducting proportionality review, "the courts
should examine the penalty imposed upon the defendant in relation to
that imposed upon his accomplices, if any"); and People v. Gleckler, 411
N.E.2d 849 (Il. 1980)(finding that defendant's sentence of death was
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IV. The Appropriate Universe
Section III of this article defined the universe of cases the Supreme
Court of Virginia considers in its proportionality review. This universe
only includes those cases in which the Commonwealth sought a death
sentence. This limited pool of cases leads to a pro-death analysis because
it disregards those cases in which, although containing similar fact
patterns, the Commonwealth chose not to proceed capitally. By elimi-
nating these cases, the narrow pool of cases used for proportionality
review is necessarily skewed in favor of death because it ignores life
sentences imposed "in similar cases."'58 The problem of limiting the
universe of cases in such a manner has been addressed by the Supreme
Court of Washington.
In State v. Harris,5 9 the defendant was sentenced to death for a
contract killing. Because the prosecution had never sought the death
penalty for contract killings in the past, the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton compared defendant's case with three other contract killings where
death was not sought.60 Rather then focusing its attention on the penalty
sought in a particular case, the Washington court chose to conduct
proportionality review according to similar fact pattems. 6 1 Neverthe-
less, the court found that a sentence of death was not disproportional.
At federal habeas, Harris argued that the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington violated his due process rights by performing inadequate propor-
tionality review. 62 In analyzing petitioner's due process claim, the
district court found that Revised Code of Washington Section 10.95.130,
which parallels Virginia Code Section 17-110.1, did not provide reliable
standards or guidelines for the Supreme Court of Washington or the
parties to follow.63 The court found that the Washington statute was
overly vague for failing to define a "similar case," although the court
reasoned that the "thrust of the statute seems to require the court to
compare death penalty cases where the death penalty could have been,
but was not, requested." 64 The court further concluded that the lack of
any definition of "similar cases" deprived the defendant of notice
regarding which cases the state Supreme Court would consider to be
similar for purposes of proportionality review.65
excessive in comparison with codefendant, who had received a prison
term for the same offense, where defendant was found to be less culpable
then codefendant and defendant's rehabilitative potential was not worse
then codefendant's.)
58 Va. Code § 17-110.1(C)(2) requires the court to consider "the
penalty imposed in similar cases."
59 725 P.2d 975 (Wash. 1986).
60 Harris, 725 P.2d at 983.
61 The universe of cases considered by the Supreme Court of
Washington is set out in Wash. Rev. Code 10.95.130(2)(b), which
includes those cases "reportedin the Washington Reports or Washington
AppellateReports... in which thejudge orjury considered the imposition
of capital punishment regardless of whether it was imposed or executed,
[first category] and cases in which reports have been filed with the
supreme court under R.W. 10.95.120 [convictions of aggravated first
degree murder, second category]." Wash. Rev. Code
10.95.130(2)(b)(1996).
62 Harris v. Blodgett, 853 F.Supp. 1239, 1286 (W.D.Wash. 1994).
63Harris, 853 F.Supp. at 1288. Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.130(1)(b)
(1996) states that the Washington Supreme Court must review "whether
the death sentence is excessive or disproportionate to thepenalty imposed
in similar cases, considering both the crime and defendant." Compare
this to the Va. Code § 17-110.l(C)(2) which states that the court must
determine "[w]hetherthe sentence of deathis excessive or disproportion-
ate to the penalty imposed in similarcases, consideringboth the crime and
defendant."
64 1d. at 1288.
65 Id. at 1289. The district court also criticized the Washington
Based on these inadequacies, the district court concluded that the
Washington statute violated petitioner's due process rights by failing to
give him notice of the procedure to be followed in proportionality review.
The court found that:
Harris had no adequate notice of what "similar cases" are, how
they are to be selected, or the factors to be compared. He had
no notice of what would happen if no "similar cases" were
found. He had no adequate notice of the court's standard for
review of "similar cases."
'66
For these reasons, Harris did not have a meaningful opportunity to be
heard. As the court stated, due process requires that "all participants
operate under the same rules" and according to the Washington statute,
the vagueness of "similar cases" resulted in a uneven playing field where
the defendant was sure to lose.67
Although the district court found the Washington statute unconsti-
tutional, the Supreme Court of Washingtonthought otherwise. While the
court recognized the difficulty in defining "similar cases" for purposes
of proportionality review, it held that the statute was not subject to the
challenges posed byHarris.68 Rather, the court found that by comparing
the crime and the individual defendant to all death-eligible cases as
defined by the legislature in Revised Code of Washington Section
10.95.130(2)(b), 69 the due process concerns of Harris were adequately
addressed.
70
The court reaffirmed its Brett holding in State v. Pirtle.7 1 In Pirtle,
the Supreme Court of Washington explained why it was necessary to
include all death eligible cases. The court noted that in its original
application of proportionality review it limited the pool of cases to only
statute for failing to give an alternative procedure for proportionality
review in the event that no similar cases are available, for not giving any
standard for reviewing the selected cases leading to a superficial and
incomplete analysis by the state supreme court, and for omitting any
procedures regarding findings of fact as part of the sentence review. Id.
at 1289-90.
66 Id. at 1291.
67 Harris, 853 F.Supp. at 1291.
68 State v. Brett, 892 P.2d 29, 67 (Wash. 1995).
69 This pool of cases includes all those in which the defendant was
convicted of aggravated first degree murder, regardless of whether the
deathpenalty was sought. See State v. Lord, 822 P.2d 177 (Wash. 1991);
State v. Rupe, 743 P.2d 210 (Wash. 1987).
70 Brett, 892 P.2d at 68-69. Justice Utter, in his dissent in Brett,
criticized the majority for failing to explain why the constitutional
defects outlined in Harris had no merit. Although Justice Utter agreed
with the majority that meaningful review required a universe of cases
including all death-eligible cases, he faulted the process applied by the
majority for the following reasons: (1) after the pool of cases are chosen,
the statute is silent as to how to substantively compare these cases; (2) the
statute does not establish procedures to follow when there are no "similar
cases;" (3) there are no statutory procedures by which the parties are
notified of what cases the court may deem "similar" until after a decision
has been rendered; (4) there is no mechanism for fact finding as part of
the sentence review. Furthermore, Justice Utter concluded that the
majority failed to include those aggravated murder cases where death
was not sought and the cases it did choose to review were treated in a
conclusory fashion. This process, according to Justice Utter, "forecloses
any possibility of review or even discussion of [the majority's] conclu-
sion." He stated that this inability to review the majority's conclusion
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
"because it provides no safeguard against a death penalty which is
applied arbitrarily and without meaningful standards." Id. at 75-77.
71904 P.2d 245 (Wash. 1995).
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those where the death penalty was sought. Dissatisfied with that
limitation, the Pirtle court concluded that the appropriate universe of
cases was that defined in Brett. In Brett, the court stated that the
appropriate pool of cases includes all death eligible cases, reasoning that
"[rIefocusing [proportionality] review to ascertain only whether a death
sentence is wanton and freakish based upon the broad range of aggra-
vated murder cases provides a more reliable and justifiable standard of
'disproportionality' and renders negligible the effect of slight deviations
in the universe of 'similar cases.'
72
The analysis by the Supreme Court of Washington regarding the
appropriate universe of cases for proportionality review is instructive.
73
It highlights the problems that arise when the pool of cases is limited to
those where the prosecutor proceeded capitally. These problems are
apparent in Virginia's proportionality review procedures. Because the
72 Brett, 892 P.2d at 69 (emphasis added). See also State v. Benn,
845 P.2d 289, 316 (Wash. 1993), where the court, in conducting an in-
depth proportionality review of defendant's case, stated that "[t]he pool
of 'similar cases' includes those cases in which the death penalty was
sought and those in which it was not;" and State v. Rupe, 743 P.2d 210,
229 (Wash. 1987) where the court, in comparing Rupe's case with cases
where death was not sought and those where the defendant pleaded
guilty, stated that "similar cases" includes "cases where the defendant
was convicted of first degree aggravated murder regardless of whether
the death penalty was sought."
73 Other states that consider all death-eligible cases when conduct-
ing proportionality review include Georgia and Nebraska. See Horton v.
State, 295 S.E.2d281,289n.9 (Ga. 1982)(stating that the court compares
"cases as to which the death penalty could have been sought by the
prosecutor but was not"); State v. Williams, 287 N.W.2d 18 (Neb.
1979)(relying on Georgia's review procedures in comparing "cases
involving crimes for which the death penalty is permissible"); and State
v. Moore, 316 N.W.2d 33, 44 (Neb. 1982)(comparing the records of all
convictions of first degree murder, inviting the defendant to provide it
with cases he wished the court to consider in its proportionality review).
Supreme Court of Virginia only reviews cases that resulted in capital
convictions, life cases that were based on similar fact patterns but were
not prosecuted as capital are excluded. Therefore, relevant life cases are
taken out ofproportionality review, skewing the review in favor of death.
Moreover, the due process concerns addressed by the district court in
Harris and Justice Utter's dissent in Brett arguably apply to the Virginia
statute.
V. Conclusion
Although it is unlikely that the Supreme Court of Virginia will
follow the lead of Washington and expand the universe of cases to
include those cases that could have been prosecuted as capital but were
not, defense counsel should still make the most of what the Virginia
statute and case law requires. There are two ways to accomplish this.
First, if counsel is presented with a capital case in which a sentence
of death is clearly excessive, he or she should prepare an exhibit of cases
involving similar fact patterns that did not result in a sentence of death.
This exhibit should be included with a motion to quash the capital
indictment and should be based on the inherent proportionality require-
ment contained within the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. This is beneficial for at least two reasons. It
raises the proportionality issue at the trial level which could possibly
result in getting death out of the case. The exhibit also provides a ready-
made universe of cases that the Supreme Court of Virginia may be
willing to address on mandatory review.
Secondly, counsel should prepare an appendix to the appellant's
brief including other capital cases which demonstrate the excessiveness
of a sentence of death. By doing this, the appendix becomes part of the
record that will be reviewed by the federal courts in determining the
adequacy of the Supreme Court of Virginia's appellate review.
Regardless of which method is appropriate in the defendant's
situation, it is advisable that defense counsel play an active role in
proportionality review. Otherwise, it is a virtual guarantee that the
Supreme Court of Virginia will ignore its statutory duty to ensure that the
defendant's sentence of death is proportional.
"LIFE" = LIFE: CORRECTING JUROR MISCONCEPTIONS
BY: LISA M. JENIO
I. Introduction
In 1994, the Virginia legislature abolished parole for capital of-
fenses committed after January 1, 19 95 .1 However, a number of studies
have shown that the average layperson believes that a capital defendant,
if sentenced to life imprisonment, will serve only a few years in prison
before being released on parole.2 In order to combat such misconcep-
tions, itis essentialthat defense counselintroduce evidence ofadefendant's
1 Va. Code § 53.1-165.1 (Supp. 1994). In pertinent part, § 53.1-
165.1 provides that" [a]ny person sentenced to a term of incarceration for
a felony offense committed on or after January 1, 1995, shall not be
eligible for parole upon that offense."
2 See infra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
parole ineligibility at trial. Parole ineligibility evidence may be intro-
duced for two purposes: 1) to rebut evidence of future dangerousness,
and 2) to mitigate the offense.
In Simmons v. South Carolina the United States Supreme Court
explicitly recognized that a defendant has a constitutional right to
introduce evidence of his or her parole ineligibility to rebut evidence of
future dangerousness offered by the prosecution. However, even when
the Commonwealth does not rely specifically on the future dangerous-
ness aggravating factor, defense counsel in Virginia should argue that
evidence of parole ineligibility is admissible based upon: (1) the Four-
teenth Amendment due process right to rebut the Commonwealth's case
for death, as any proof of vileness necessarily implicates future danger-
3 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
